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Implementing Equal Pay Policy: Clash
Between Gender Equality and
Corporatism
Milja Saari,1 Johanna Kantola ,*2 and
Paula Koskinen Sandberg2
More often than not gender equality policies are good on paper but fall foul of
politicized implementation processes. The reasons behind this are becoming a key
area of investigation for feminist scholarship on the implementation of gender
policies. This article analyzes the barriers to implementing gender equality policies
in a corporatist regime. Focusing on the 2007 nurses’ industrial action in Finland,
the article considers the case of “Nancy the Nurse,” which aimed at negotiating
higher wages for nurses. Our findings suggest that the corporatist regime effec-
tively prevented the implementation of gender equality policy, thus upholding the
status quo and maintaining current wage relativities.
Introduction
This article contributes to an emergent field of studies on the imple-
mentation of gender equality policies, by analyzing the barriers to a specific
gender equality policy under conditions of corporatism. In the context of an
historic equal pay initiative in Finland in 2006–2007, itself derived from
an election promise of the National Coalition Party to increase the wages of
educated women in the public sector, we consider the case of nurses’
industrial action in Finland in 2007. As a policy process, this case was excep-
tional: The government overrode the social partners in the local government
sector, required local authorities to give a pay increase to feminized, demand-
ing jobs in the local government sector, and allocated an extra budget for these
pay increases. What also made this case unique was its lasting impact on
Finnish society. Coming after the 2007 collective bargaining round, and the
nurses’ industrial action that eventually resulted in nationwide wage increases,
Finland was hit hard by the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. Since then,
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the nurses have been unfairly blamed for undermining national competitive-
ness, and used as an admonitory symbol against any group of (feminized)
employees in the public sector, who questioned that they were underpaid.
In various national contexts, nurses have attempted to negotiate pay
increases and their trade unions have taken industrial action (Briskin 2012;
Henttonen et al. 2013; Koff 2016). However, in Finland these struggles have
only been rewarded with very modest results. Even today, relatively low pay is
still an ongoing challenge for nurses and their unions. This article considers
the implementation of a particular gender equality policy. It shows how insti-
tutions and gendered power structures militated against the social value and
national prestige of the nursing profession to prevent the award of better pay.
We analyze the role of the Finnish corporatist regime and show how it main-
tained the status quo in wage outcomes in the Finnish labor market.
In gender and politics research, questions around the implementation of
gender equality policies are becoming a key theme. Gender equality policies
often read well on paper, but their translation into meaningful policy can be
undone by implementation gaps (Creegan et al. 2003; Engeli and Mazur 2018;
Holli and Kantola 2007; Ongaro and Valotti 2008). The implementation gap
reflects the lack of interest and motivation to promote gender equality, and
the lack of resources and institutional support structures, and is widened by
outright resistance to gender policies, as in this case. We draw upon the idea
of non–decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 1963; Marchbank 1994),
the deliberate tactic of limiting the scope of decision-making to relatively
noncontroversial issues. The negotiations for, and the implementation of,
the salary increases for nurses, from its emergence as an issue onto the politi-
cal agenda, provide a critical analysis of corporatism through the lens of non–
decision-making.
Corporatism in the Nordic context is marked by collaboration and negoti-
ation between employers, employee confederations, and the government to
establish economic and social policy, including gender equality policy. The
corporatist system has been, and continues to be, the dominant structure of
power, and while this appears to reflect a balance of interests, corporatism in
practice is highly gendered. Most labor market organizations continue to be
male dominated in Europe and this is also the case in Finland (Bergqvist 1991
2004; Koskinen Sandberg 2018), where gender equality tends to occupy a
marginalized place on the agendas of the central actors. Despite the central
role of corporatism in shaping working conditions, and in the pursuance of
gender equality policies and legislation, empirical research into gender and
corporatism in Finland has been conspicuous by its absence (Heiskanen and
Lavikka 2014; Kainulainen and Saari 2014; Koskinen Sandberg 2016a; Saari
2016). This is especially so for studies on the implementation of gender equal-
ity policies in general and equal pay policies in particular.
The political mobilization of nurses for a significant increase in pay and the
Finnish government’s historic equal pay initiative in 2006–2007 provide the
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perfect case to analyze the implementation failure of gender equality policy in
the context of corporatism. The article shows how, in the context of corporate
political bargaining, this firm political commitment evaporated in the actual
implementation process. Our distinctive contribution is the illustration of how
corporatism resisted the implementation of gender equality policy, and how
this resulted in the disappearance of the gender equality objective. The questions
posed are: (i) How did the corporatist system respond to the governmental
equal pay initiative? (ii) Were the equal pay initiative and its implementation
successful, and were the increases in nurses’ pay a reduction in the gender pay
gap? (iii) Were there any long-lasting changes in gendered power relations in
collective bargaining? It is here that we pay particular attention to issues of gen-
der and class. We argue that this case produced stark class-based distinctions
and engendered contentions between different categories of nurses. We focus
on the discursive structures that characterized corporatist processes between
trade unions and employers’ organizations, and ask what happened to the goal
of gender equality in the implementation process.
Implementing Gender Equality Policies
The scholarly interest in the implementation of gender equality policies
represents a new and exciting direction in gender policy research. It signifies
a shift of the analytical focus to the nature and form of the process, which fol-
lows the adoption of gender policies: ‘implementation, evaluation and impact’
(Engeli and Mazur 2018, 112). Scholars working in this field suggest that
more knowledge is needed about the barriers that gender policies face in the
implementation process—the knowledge of which will unlock their potential
to transform gender inequalities. Nevertheless, the importance of these emerg-
ing studies is that they begin to shed light on the fate of gender equality poli-
cies after they are adopted, by focusing on the negotiations, contestations, and
resistance in the implementation phase (Callerstig 2014; Engeli and Mazur
2018, 113). More discursive approaches to implementation seek to trace the
forms of passive, as well as active, resistance and the discursive negotiations
about framing, which impact how gender policies are (not) put into practice
(Kantola and Lombardo 2017).
Engeli and Mazur (2018, 116) draw on previous research in the field
of implementation studies to distinguish between four different types of
implementation instruments: first, authority instruments (e.g., outlawing
discrimination); second, incentive instruments (e.g., providing extra funding
for advancing gender equality); third, capacity or learning instruments (e.g.,
gender training); and finally, symbolic instruments (e.g., information cam-
paign about domestic violence). Embedded in the logic of these instruments is
their implementation success—the softer the instrument, the more challenges
implementation of the policy potentially entails. Yet, context matters too,
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and different instruments may well suit different political systems. The
European Union’s (EU) soft gender equality policies (e.g., funding and equal-
ity programs) have been shown to be more important in Southern European
Member States, whilst the EU’s hard anti-discrimination laws have greater sig-
nificance in the Nordic countries (Kantola 2010). Usually, these instruments
are mixed and combined with one another when implementing gender
policies (Engeli and Mazur 2018).
Finnish gender equality policy has long been characterized as ticking all the
right boxes at the policy stage, only to untick them at the implementation
stage. A particular characteristic of gender policies in Finland is the drawing
up of gender equality action plans and programs without allocating sufficient
budgetary resources or personnel for their actual implementation. For in-
stance, in relation to equal pay, the social partners and government officials
sat together for years in the tripartite Equal Pay Program working group.
They commissioned studies into the gender pay gap, made recommendations
and campaigns about equal pay, and yet there have been few tangible results
in diminishing the gender pay gap. The failure of the policy has been funda-
mentally shaped by the softness of the instruments chosen, and the lack of
legislative instruments which have rarely been used to advance equal pay in
Finland (Koskinen Sandberg 2016a; Saari 2015).
In this context, Engeli and Mazur further argue that when evaluating the fi-
nal stages of the implementation process and the actual outcomes of policies,
the “ultimate goal” of the policy must be gender transformation (Engeli and
Mazur 2018, 120). Like “gender equality”, gender transformation is a con-
tested concept. Engeli and Mazur (2018, 121–3) propose a distinction between
(i) gender-neutral, (ii) gender rowback, (iii) gender accommodation, and (iv)
gender transformation in terms of outcomes of gender policy. On this mea-
sure, gender-neutral policies must be considered as examples of symbolic and
failed policies; a result of a lack of sufficient resources, for example. Gender
rowback represents an outright backlash in gender equality policies, explained
by an anti-gender equality policy, despite professed benign intentions (Verloo
2018). In gender accommodation, traditional gender roles are entrenched,
and social change inhibited, for example, differentials in care allowances that
are used mainly by women to care for small children at home. Finally, in gen-
der transformation, gendered and sexualized norms are challenged, changed,
and displaced as a result of gender policies. Such gender transformation does
not increase inequalities within different groups of women based on race,
ethnicity, class, or sexual orientation.
Our study is embedded in the context of this emerging feminist scholar-
ship. Whilst not underplaying the significance of the struggles in framing pol-
icy where actors can be very differently placed in terms of their respective
resources and capacities, the analytical focus here is centered on processes,
actors, and resources during the implementation stage of a specific gender
policy. Unlike advocacy and campaigning, then, implementation demands a
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different form of approach to negotiation and resistance. Finally, it is evident
that the outcome of the gender policy must be the final arbiter of its “success”.
Considering the outcome of the gender policy then allows for the question of
whether they result in transformations of existing gender inequalities or in the
loss of the original goals through the process, leading to increased inequalities
increased between, for instance, different groups of women.
We suggest that in analyzing these processes, theoretical notions of legiti-
macy, power, and non–decision-making are useful. Concepts of legitimacy
and power can help to reveal what impact the government’s particular way of
presenting the equal pay initiative had on its implementation. In particular,
we are interested in how power relations in political debates constructed and
legitimated outcomes that were later institutionalized in societies. We argue
that gender equality in corporatist procedures is informed by understandings
of what is legitimate, and how constructions of gender equality and legitimacy
involve power relations that contribute to the understanding of the imple-
mentation gap in corporatist political arrangements.
We draw upon ideas articulated in previous research that the contested po-
sition of gender equality in Finnish policy-making requires a move beyond
the dichotomy of legitimate and illegitimate power (Nousiainen et al. 2013).
The difficulties of implementing gender equality initiatives, such as the one
analyzed here, cannot be understood by simply suggesting that gender equality
is legitimate or illegitimate. Instead, gender equality is constantly pushed to
the undecided grey zone of unlegitimacy in different policy implementation
processes. Gender equality becomes neither legitimate nor illegitimate, despite
its enshrined position in national legislation and in the collective agreements
(CAs) between labor market organizations (Nousiainen et al. 2013). This the-
oretical approach gives rise to questions as to which claims for gender equality
are legitimate? Or, alternatively, how different discourses use legitimacy in
gender equality debates, how does gender equality move outside the sphere of
the legitimate (Nousiainen et al. 2013; Saari 2015), and how are these patterns
institutionalized in informal practices and norms?
We also utilize the notion of non–decision-making as both a theoretical
framework and analytical tool. Non–decision–making is concerned with sys-
temic bias, issue suppression, and the covert use of power. As an analytical
tool, it provides pertinent advantages to those wishing to ask critical feminist
questions, and analyze situations where there are significant, but latent, power
conflicts and actors deliberately limit the scope of decision-making to rela-
tively noncontroversial issues (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 1963; Bergqvist,
Bjarnega˚rd, and Zetterberg 2015; Marchbank 1994). This applies to the de-
scription of how gender equality issues can become marginalized with the aim
of keeping them off the political agenda. The asymmetrical power relations
between the different stakeholders exemplified by the case of “Nancy the
Nurse”, not only affect which issues get onto political agendas but also the
kind of decisions that are ultimately made. Marchbank (1994, 2000) describes
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policy-making as a series of hurdles or barriers; policies can “stumble” at any
hurdle, at any point in the policy process. For the purposes of this article, we
regard hurdles as “barriers” and scrutinize them in our analysis of policy
implementation.
Welfare State Employment and the Undervaluation of
Feminized Care Work in a Corporatist System
The welfare state has been central in shaping women’s citizenship and labor
market opportunities in the Nordic countries, including Finland (Anttonen
1994; Hirvonen 2014; Hernes 1987; Julkunen 1994, 2009; Korpi 2000; Pfau-
Effinger 1993). The welfare state has often been described as women-friendly
(Anttonen 1994; Hernes 1987; Julkunen 2009), although its women-
friendliness is not uncontested (Borchorst and Siim 2002, 2008; Kantola 2006;
Koskinen Sandberg 2018). The claim to women-friendliness hinges upon the
welfare state’s role in providing its citizens with services, such as day care,
which enables women’s employment. However, the welfare state is a major
employer of Nordic women and has relied heavily on the relatively inexpen-
sive labor they provide (Hernes 1987; Koskinen Sandberg 2018; Walby 1990).
The feminization of labor, and its attendant partner of low pay, is a feature of
the feminized care and educational sector that is widely shared with much
welfare state employment. Welfare state employment may be characterized by
qualified employees and demanding work, but it is marked by relatively low
pay (Koskinen Sandberg, To¨rnroos, and Kohvakka 2018).
Historically, welfare state employment was a significant route for women
to enter the world of paid employment and the economic independence that
grants full citizenship (Aaltonen et al. 2016). At the core of this gendered citi-
zenship was also the heteronormative ideal of the nuclear family, and a highly
gendered division of labor both within the family and in society more broadly
(Julkunen 2009; Laiho and Riikonen 2016). Within Finnish welfare state em-
ployment, the nursing profession has a specific history (Haggre´n 2005) and
occupies a paradoxical place in Finnish society: Nurses have a very high social
status (Magnusson 2008), but very low wages. This conflict between regard
and reward has been shaped by the development of Finnish welfare state and
its strong connection to the public sector (Laiho and Riikonen 2016).
Finland’s nurses were professionalized in the postwar period, an era when
nursing was valorized as the ideal representation of womanhood and female
citizenship. Nursing itself, however, was not regarded as a profession worthy
of appropriate pay and conditions; rather, it was perceived as more of a natu-
ral extension to women’s duties within the private sphere. Nurses were ideal-
ized, but viewed as a response to a calling; claims for decent wages were
consequently viewed as unsuitable (Haggre´n 2005). Education and training
had a similar ethos and were openly normative, emphasizing Christian values
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and the suitability of feminine nurturing and caring qualities (Laiho and
Riikonen 2016). Earning a living was seen as an unsuitable motivation to
work as a nurse. Instead, the inspiration was expected to be based on the
“natural” love of helping the sick, and giving their unswerving loyalty was to
medical doctors (mostly men at the time) and patients; nurses’ own needs
were secondary. Initially, nursing was also markedly bourgeois; the first
Finnish nurses were educated daughters of well-off families (Haggre´n 2005).
Nurses’ low wages have been an issue of societal discussion since the 1940s
(Haggre´n 2005; Henttonen et al. 2013; Koskinen Sandberg and Saari 2019).
Despite major social and political shifts, such as the emergence of the labor
movement and collective bargaining, the ratification of the International
Labour Organization (ILO) equal pay convention (ILO 1951) in the 1960s,
the rising level of nurses’ education, and changes in the institutional context,
wages have continued to remain relatively low. Like many other countries,
Finland used to have different wage levels for men and women. This was rein-
forced by governmental decision-making in 1945 when the so-called wage reg-
ulation decision (Bergholm 2005) institutionalized the lower level of women’s
wages, and more significantly put downward pressure on the wage levels of
feminized work such as nursing. The formal decision to pay women approxi-
mately 80 percent of men’s wages for equally demanding work was in effect
for more than ten years, until it became illegal (Bergholm 2005). The socially
constructed idea that women’s work was worth less than men’s in general also
shaped wage levels of feminized work within the Finnish welfare state.
The undervaluing of feminized care work is not a historical detail; it is
institutionalized within the contemporary structures of Finnish CAs, and
negotiated by actors within the corporatist system. One reason why equal
pay policies have been less than successful in diminishing the gender pay gap
is intrinsically related to Finnish corporatist labor market structures, which
are based on consensual agreements between employers, wage earners, and
the Finnish government. The power wielded by trade union confederations
and employer organizations has, together with the government, held sway
over labor market issues, policy, and legislation (Bergqvist 2004; Koskinen
Sandberg 2018; Siaroff 1999; Woldendorp 1997). In Finland, both the trade
unions and employer confederations are well organized: Union density is 64.5
percent (women 70 percent and men 59 percent) (Ahtiainen 2015). Most
employers are also organized in employers’ federations.
In Finland, the working conditions of employees are determined by a com-
bination of legislation and CAs. Between 1968 and 2006, general agreements
on terms and conditions of employment, and the level of pay rises, were nego-
tiated in tripartite cooperation as a part of incomes policy agreements. The
government was one of the negotiating partners in this process, and took part
in the agreement by introducing social policy initiatives and taxation levels
that were favorable to both wage earners and employers. Some of the tripartite
centralized labor market settlements have included equal pay allowances (first
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in 1988) for female-dominated sectors and jobs. The overall significance of
the equality allowances has, however, been modest. The centralized collective
bargaining system effectively maintained the gendered hierarchies of the labor
market and the primacy of male-dominated sectors and jobs (Koskinen
Sandberg 2018; Martikainen 2000).
Whilst the conflict between capital and labor remains a visible and accept-
able axis of negotiations, gender remains a conspicuously silenced aspect of
corporatism (Saari 2013). This makes for theoretical and methodological chal-
lenges. Previous research on Sweden illustrated how women face particular
difficulties in gaining access to corporatist negotiation processes, and these
challenges have been exacerbated by the transfer of corporatist power to the
supranational level of the EU (Bergqvist 1991, 2004; Oldersma 2005). The cor-
poratist regime and its central actors have also been criticized for protecting
their vested interests in policy-making, and by virtue of this, protecting male
interests at the expense of women (Koskinen Sandberg 2016b; Saari 2015). In
this context, the formulation and implementation of gender equality policies
have proved extraordinarily difficult.
Feminized Welfare State Employment Today
The local government sector is a significant employer in Finland. It
employs 419,000 people in a nation of only five million. The local government
sector is, by any measure, feminized; 80 percent of its employees are women.
The level of feminization varies across sectors and within its five major CAs.
Of the CAs, the General CA, which covers registered and practical nurses, is
both the largest and the lowest paying of the local government sector CAs.
The other CAs include the Technical CA, the Education CA, the Physicians’
CA (feminized, but high paying), and the Hourly Workers’ CA. Each of these
CAs has their own wage determination practices and different wage levels,
even though local government, either in a city or municipality, is considered
one employer. Each of the CAs is also negotiated separately.
“Registered” and “practical” nurse are the two most common job titles
within the Finnish local government sector. In 2017, there were 42,900 regis-
tered nurses and 35,700 practical nurses working for local government. Both
occupations are highly feminized, with no less than 90 percent of employees
being women (Local Government Employers 2019). In 2017, the average
monthly income for a registered nurse was e3,118, of which e2,445 was basic
pay, with the remainder the result of working shifts. For a practical nurse, the
average monthly income was e2,702 with a basic pay of e2,095 (Local
Government Employers 2019). As a comparison, total monthly earnings for
an electrical engineer in the local government sector are e3,921. For an ele-
mentary school teacher, total monthly earnings are e3,544. In 2017, within
the local government sector, the average monthly earnings for men were
e3,381 and for women e2,940. In the entire Finnish labor market, men earned
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e3,696 on average, whereas women earned e3,101 a month in 2017 (Official
Statistics of Finland 2018). The income level for registered nurses is therefore
very typical for women in Finland, whereas income level for practical nurses is
below average. Registered nurses have a bachelor’s degree, whereas practical
nurses receive a three-year vocational education. The two groups of nurses are
represented by different trade unions, registered nurses mainly by TEHY—the
Union of Health and Social Care Professionals in Finland, and practical nurses
by SUPER—the Finnish Union of Practical Nurses. The two trade unions col-
laborate, and did so in the 2007 industrial action, but despite their occupa-
tional similarity they represent divergent class interests (Koskinen Sandberg
and Saari 2019).
The gender pay gap, although apparent within these professions as well,
mainly arises in relation to the local government sector as a whole and the
Finnish labor market more generally. The main question is not whether men
working in these professions are better paid; it is how the undervaluation of
the nursing profession, resulting from its specific history, and currently insti-
tutionalized within the structures of local government sector CA system, has
persisted (Koskinen Sandberg, To¨rnroos, and Kohvakka 2018). As the welfare
state has faced and met the challenges brought upon it by neoliberalism, aus-
terity, budget cuts, and intensification, the monetary undervaluation of
nurses’ work has become increasingly difficult to resolve. Pay increases for
large employee groups are costly, and thus such claims have met strong resis-
tance. Working conditions within the public sector were already weakened in
the 1990s after a severe recession in Finland, and subsequent changing ideas
about the role of the welfare state (Kantola and Kananen 2013; Laiho and
Riikonen 2016).
The Case of “Nancy the Nurse”
Finland and other Nordic countries are often regarded as the most gender-
equal countries in the world. However, the gender pay gap, a structural feature
of the Finnish labor market, still stands at 16 percent (Official Statistics of
Finland 2018). Equal pay is considered one of the main goals to achieve gen-
der equality and has been a central gender equality policy goal for more than
fifty years. Despite this, the gender pay gap has remained stubbornly persis-
tent. Nurses’ low salaries bear all the hallmarks of a deliberately undervalued
feminized public sector occupation (Koskinen Sandberg, To¨rnroos, and
Kohvakka 2018). Even though nurses’ low salaries have been a major issue for
their trade unions since 1954, and despite registered nurses having a relatively
high educational level (bachelor’s degree) and professional respect in society,
their salaries in Finland are approximately 20 percent lower than the average
in other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries.
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Into this context, then, came the historic election promise by the Finnish
right-wing National Coalition Party to “Nancy the Nurse” (a moniker for the
underpaid highly educated female nurse) in 2007 to significantly increase her
salary (for other studies, see Henttonen et al. 2013; Kunelius, Noppari, and
Reunanen 2010). After the elections, the nurses’ trade unions held the
new prime ministerial party to account for its election promise. This led to an
exceptional policy process where the government rode roughshod over their
social partners in the local government sector by issuing a diktat instructing
them to give a pay increase to feminized, demanding jobs in the local govern-
ment sector. The implementation of this exceptional policy is our chief
concern.
Initially, there were two groups of nurses collaborating in this case: regis-
tered nurses and practical nurses represented by their respective trade unions,
TEHY and SUPER. The two groups of nurses had obvious shared interests, al-
beit underpinned by class-based differences. For example, lengthy industrial
action would have been financially prohibitive for practical nurses, who have
very low incomes. Thus, the practical nurses eventually reached an agreement
with Local Government Employers, leaving registered nurses, and their trade
union TEHY, to pursue their wage claims with industrial action—our focus is
therefore orientated toward the struggle of the registered nurses.
Methodology and Data
The data used in the analysis are the key texts produced by the central
actors of the 2007 industrial action: TEHY—the Union of Health and Social
Care Professionals (N¼ 109), SUPER—the Finnish Union of Practical Nurses
(N¼ 66), and KT—the Local Government Employers (N¼ 22) (hereafter
TEHY, SUPER, and KT). In our analysis, we utilize the editorials and chair-
persons’ columns and relevant articles in their member magazines between
2006 and 2008, which covers the period before, during, and after the nurses’
industrial action. The public statements given by these key actors concerning
equal pay, salaries, and mass resignations in 2007 are included in the data too.
We also interviewed two key actors from TEHY to establish a clearer under-
standing of the industrial action, its formation, and goals. We planned to in-
terview key politicians, especially those from the National Coalition Party, but
our requests were ignored. This is highly unusual in the context of Finnish
politics, where politicians are easily accessible for research purposes, and a
strong indication that the controversial nature of this event can still disturb
even after ten years. Our focus therefore falls primarily on those union mem-
bers the figure “Nancy” came to discursively represent, analysis of interviews
with their key actors, and the most relevant texts. We also utilize previous re-
search on this case in our analysis, namely Henttonen et al. (2013), Kunelius
et al. (2010), and Koskinen Sandberg and Saari (2011).
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Methodologically, we approach these texts through the method of discur-
sive reading. Discourse analysis illustrates how each text offers its own inter-
pretation of the issue. On the one hand, this allows us to trace the dominant
discourses and frames that underpinned the statements, and on the other,
highlights that which remained unsaid, was not spoken of; the silences and
marginal discourses (Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2009). The question thus
becomes how different aspects of the case were, and were not, discursively
constructed by different actors and the consequences this had for the imple-
mentation of the equal pay initiative. In so doing, we use the barriers recog-
nized in analyses of various stages of the policy process (Marchbank 1994,
2000): objective interest, public agenda, political agenda, decision, and imple-
mentation. In doing so, we show how non–decision-making in (i) the political
agenda as a first barrier, (ii) decisions as a second, and (iii) implementation as
a third. In addition, we analyze the aftermath of this policy process.
Analyzing “Nancy the Nurse” Through Three Policy
Barriers
First Barrier: Making “Nancy the Nurse” a Political Phenomenon
The first step to implementing a gender equality policy was to get the issue
onto the political agenda, by eliciting broader public support for the objec-
tives, at which TEHY was particularly successful. The failure of the incremen-
tal ways to promote equal pay had led to frustration among nurses and
pressure within TEHY for stronger forms of action in claiming better wages
for nurses (Key trade union actor A and Key trade union actor B). TEHY had
campaigned for pay rises for nurses since the summer 2005, but its new action
was carefully and strategically planned by the TEHY leadership (Key trade
union actor A and Key trade union actor B). Consequently, the low pay of
nurses began to enter the political agenda more forcefully in 2006 and 2007.
TEHY lobbied political parties and affiliated interests as well as among its
partnership organizations to gain a broad base of support for its demands.
The idea was to build up a level of political pressure, not just for one-off pay
rises to be included in the future government’s platform, but to get higher pay
rises earmarked in the CA for the municipal sector (Key trade union actor B).
In 2007 then, it was perceived as a moment of historic impetus for nurses:
There were parliamentary elections, a new government and its platform, and
the CAs demanded by TEHY were to be renewed.
The lobbying of nurses’ unions had indeed been successful. The conserva-
tive National Coalition Party made a promise in its election manifesto in 2007
to aim for an equality incomes policy agreement that would guarantee a pay
increase from the state budget for highly educated, but low-paid, women in
the public sector (Key trade union actor B; see also Henttonen et al. 2013;
Koskinen Sandberg and Saari 2019). National Coalition Party MP Sari
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Sarkomaa—who was a nurse before becoming a politician—had proposed a
model in which the government would declare its aim to allocate an extra sub-
sidy if there was a pay agreement in the municipal sector where educated fem-
inized occupations obtained higher-than-average wage increases (PTK 123/
2006 vp., cited in Finnish Parliament 2006; Kunelius, Noppari, and Reunanen
2010). This proposal was also repeated by party leader Jyrki Katainen in an
election panel (Kunelius, Noppari, and Reunanen 2010, 109).
In 2007, the Finnish economy was in a strong position, and trade unions in
export industries were able to access higher wage increases than would have
been obtained in the centralized frame. In addition, the employers’
Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) refused to make further centralized
comprehensive settlements, reflecting a preference for promoting collective
bargaining at the level of individual unions and local workplaces instead
(Koskinen Sandberg and Saari 2019). This was also a period when expecta-
tions in the public sector and especially for nurses for better pay were strong.
In 2007, TEHY’s chairperson wrote: “The union round suits us in the TEHY
very well” (TEHY 9/2007). At this point, the policy initiative had not stum-
bled (Marchbank 1994, 2000); on the contrary, it was regarded as the starting
point for the union round, with extra budgets expected for wage increases and
stable public and political support for the cause.
Second Barrier: Negotiating Higher Wages for Nurses
In the policy process, negotiating on the content of the policy is one of the
potential stages when the tactics of non–decision-making are employed to
make the initiative less threatening to the status quo (Bachrach and Baratz
1962, 196; Marchbank 1994). After the elections, and with the collective bar-
gaining over the new agreements in the municipal sector ahead, TEHY set the
goal of a 24-percent pay increase over a 2.5-year period (Kunelius, Noppari,
and Reunanen 2010). The collective bargaining between the employers’ union
KT and TEHY made no progress between August and November 2007 (TEHY
and KT editorials, Fall 2007). KT had argued that the demand for wage
increases was far too expensive and the state subsidy was nowhere near to cov-
ering the costs. In addition, a typical feature of the local government collective
bargaining system was that other public sector unions were hostile toward the
idea that the pay rises would be targeted to nurses only (Key trade union actor
B; see also Koskinen Sandberg and Saari 2019). All unions negotiated on be-
half of specific employee groups covered by the General CA, and it was argu-
ably inevitable that they would resist wage increases allocated to nurses only.
It became clear that to gain wage increases, nurses would have had to elicit the
support of other groups. This promised to be notoriously difficult.
As a negotiation tactic, TEHY used an unusually strong maneuver by
threatening mass resignation if their demands were not met, a strategy that
was perceived as harsh and attracted plenty of criticism (KT 6/2007; see also
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Henttonen et al. 2013). Politicians and the Parliament opposed TEHY’s
demands for a 24-percent pay increase and delivered a sharp criticism of the
mass resignation threat. On 15 November, the Parliament voted for an emer-
gency act that would oblige nurses to come to work in cases where patients’
health was in danger (MTV 2007), relieving the pressure that the threat put
on KT and the government. Three days after the emergency act was approved,
and two days before the threatened mass resignation was due, a settlement be-
tween TEHY and KT was reached (TEHY and KT editorials from November
2007). Members of TEHY were given an agreement until the end of 2011
(four years), which differed from other CAs in the schedule of pay increases,
and a separate TEHY-only protocol which the KT emphasized was not to be
considered as a separate CA (KT 6/2007, 1/2008).
Figures and numbers were central in the framing of the political battle. In
the media debate, the two significant sums that were bandied around were
e500 and e150 million. The debate about the e500 per month, which origi-
nated in one of the Finnish tabloids, was whether the National Coalition Party
had promised this pay increase to the nurses during the election campaign
(Key trade union actor A). The e150 million related to the amount by which
the government had agreed orally, but not in writing, to support the increase
of public sector women’s salaries in the following four years during the nego-
tiations (Kunelius, Noppari, and Reunanen 2010). This figure was insufficient
to meet a pay increase of e500, which increased the tensions in the debate. In
contrast, TEHY avoided any reference to the e500 claim, and for tactical rea-
sons preferred the negotiations to proceed without revealing the exact figure
they were aiming to achieve (Key trade union actor A).
It became evident that, in spite of strong public support for the nurses as
respected professionals whose salaries were too low, and public opinion that
recognized the electoral promises that they had received, the demand for pay
rises specific to nurses only was met with very strong opposition and hostility
by the central corporatist actors: Parliament, government, and in particular
key labor market organizations (Key trade union actor A, Key trade union ac-
tor B; see also Koskinen Sandberg and Saari 2019). Negotiations between
TEHY and KT were made extremely difficult by official opposition in public
and unofficial obstruction behind the scenes. Here, even though TEHY man-
aged to achieve wage increases, the policy implementation stumbled as a result
of covert and overt resistance.
In terms of gender policy implementation studies, this case represents a
financial incentive instrument, namely providing extra funding for advancing
gender equality (Engeli and Mazur 2018). The final agreement was very
complex; in its aftermath, there were competing interpretations of what was
achieved (for details, see table 1). TEHY claimed that the agreement ensured a
22–26 percent increase in nurses pay over the next four years. KT said that the
settlement meant only a 16-percent pay increase over the four-year period,
and certainly, by indicating what is new by an asterisk (*) in table 1, illustrates
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Table 1. Pay increases
Date KVTES 2007–2009 TEHY settlement/agreement
October 1, 2007 General pay increase 3.4% No increase
December
2007
e270 one-off increase
(kertaera¨)
e270 one-off increase (kertaera¨),
if a member of TEHY union
November 19, 2007
January 1,
2008
No increase Gender equality bonus (samapalk-
kaisuusera¨) 2.6% Local sectoral al-
lowance (paikallinen ja¨rjestelyera¨)
0.5% (amounts to the increases in
KVTES March 1, 2008)
Liitteen 3 hinnoittelujentukset *new
(hoitotyo¨n johto, esimiehet ja
vaativat ammattitehta¨va¨t)
February 1,
2008
No increase General pay increase 4% (amounts
to the general pay increase in
KVTES October 1, 2007)
March 1,
2008
Gender equality bonus 2.6%
Local sectoral allowance 0.5%
No increase
September 1,
2008
General pay increase 2.4% General pay increase 2.4%
May 1, 2009 Gender equality bonus 0.5%
(as a local sectoral
agreement)
Local sectoral agreement
0.3%
Gender equality bonus 0.5% as a
general pay increase Local sectoral
agreement 0.3%
September 1,
2009
General pay increase 2.4% General pay increase 2.4%
January 1, 2010 No increase Gender equality bonus *new 1.3%
targeted general pay increase
(kohdennettu yleiskorotus) 0.3%
local sectoral agreement
Liitteen 3 hinnoittelujentukset
(hoitotyo¨n johto, esimiehet ja
vaativat ammattitehta¨va¨t)
September 1,
2010
Not agreed Local sectoral agreement 0.7% *new
to advance productivity
May 1, 2011 Not agreed Local sectoral agreement 0.7% *new
0–2% depending on development
in personnel numbers between
October 2006 and October 2010
Source. Adopted from the employers, journal: Kuntatyo¨nantaja (June 2007, 9).
*New wage increases.
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that the specific increases that TEHY had negotiated would occur during the
last two years of the period. TEHY’s interpretation was that its own agreement
had been reached, and that it was would be negotiating over the specificities
and the implementation. The interpretation of the employer’s organization
KT was different. They stated that this was not a separate agreement, but a set-
tlement or a written record (KT 6/2007). In sum, even in cases of incentive
instruments being used in gender policy implementation, these contradictory
interpretations about what was agreed point toward nascent strong barriers in
implementation and in advancing gender equality.
Third Barrier: Implementation of the “e500” at Local Level
Even good policies face challenges of implementation. Non–decision-mak-
ing and variant other forms of resistance can be mobilized, which can push a
legitimate initiative to the grey zone of nonlegitimacy. The first problem for
the implementation was embedded in the very phrasing of the statement of
intent by the government platform (Government Program 2007–2010). It did
not specify which professions and which tasks would be entitled to the
increases. Approximately 80 percent of the personnel working in the munici-
pal sector were women, and in most municipal professions some form of
qualification and formal education were required. The low salaries of
the nurses had long been a bone of contention, but so were the low salaries in
education and library work. As Key trade union actor A said:
We tried to negotiate [with the government] that could it steer in a
more detailed manner the increases in pay and decide to whom should
the increases be targeted at but there was no political readiness to do
that. So the money was left to be torn apart in the negotiation tables in
the municipal sector.
The second hindrance was the collapse of the negotiating organization, the
Toimihenkilo¨iden Neuvotteluja¨rjesto¨ Tnj r.y (TNJ), of which both TEHY and
SUPER were part of, and the disruption that was caused for the structures and
processes of local bargaining in the health sector as a consequence. TEHY dis-
engaged itself from the bargaining alliance when SUPER, the practical nurses’
union, accepted KT’s proposal for a wage settlement (Koskinen Sandberg and
Saari 2019). The implementation of the TEHY agreement, or the “additional
protocol” for TEHY, as the employers’ organization KT wanted to call the
wage settlement, was challenging for local-level hospitals and health-care cen-
ters. TEHY had 13 regional offices and 300 local branches around Finland.
The separate TEHY agreement meant that TEHY had to have its own shop
stewards and own negotiation practices at local level. TEHY’s shop stewards
(local union representatives) negotiated with local employers’ representatives
about how the local allowances should be divided among the TEHY members
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(Key trade union actor B). The tense environment, which was caused by the
inflamed atmosphere in which local bargaining took place, was the third rea-
son for the implementation problems. The separate TEHY agreement meant
that nurses belonging to different trade unions were paid differently for doing
the same job. Pay rises were targeted to TEHY members only (Key trade union
actor A).
TEHY and its members attracted hostility from other unions, their mem-
bers, and employers, and during the threat of mass resignations, the employers
exerted a high level of pressure on local TEHY representatives and members.
In TEHY’s bulletin of October 31, 2007 (TEHY 2, 3), there was an article enti-
tled, “The employer grills [us] because it panics.” According to the bulletin,
the employers were actively making demands against the mass resignation as a
collective, industrial action, and moreover that some employers had
demanded personal and written resignations from individual nurses. Some of
the nurses working on temporary contracts were asked, presumably because
of their precarious employment status, to give an assurance that they would
not take part in any forthcoming industrial action. In some cities, employers
had opened positions for recruitment that it had found in the mass resigna-
tion lists.
In early 2008, TEHY’s chairperson wrote in her column:
We have received messages that pay increases that are agreed upon
in the [TEHY] agreement have not been paid to members of TEHY
yet—either because of the lack of knowhow or will (TEHY 2/2008).
In sum, the equal pay initiative was not welcomed at the local level of wage
bargaining, which made effective negotiation that demands trust and open-
ness between negotiators extremely difficult. The task of implementing the
wage settlements of 2007 was ultimately made as difficult as possible by the
employers.
In the end, the idea that educated nurses should receive higher pay
increases than other personnel groups was undermined by decisions made by
KT and its local representatives, who expanded the pay increases to all work-
ing in the municipal sector. For example, the chairperson of the union for
physicians was said to be happily surprised when he heard that the equality al-
lowance was also to be paid to physicians (Key trade union actor A and Key
trade union actor B). Physicians, although a feminized occupation, were
among the highest paid in the local government sector, and as such, clearly an
inappropriate target for wage increases that were designed for those trapped
in a black hole of low pay.
The process of drafting the agreement at the local level, as a part of union
rounds, can be best described as messy and complex as the implementation.
In the union round, the state was not a negotiator, but stood outside of the bi-
partite process between social partners. Thus, the lack of any political courage
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to name the professions that the extra state subsidy should be targeted to, and
without the legal and political norms and sanctions required by the imple-
mentation of fast track measures, the whole idea of an equal pay measure
turned into a game of nudge politics (John, Smith, and Stoker 2009). In the
end, the government threw e150 million to trade unions and withdrew from
the actual implementation process. The historical equal pay initiative turned
into yet another policy failure in the promotion of equal pay and illustrated
the complexities of implementing financial incentive instruments as tools in
gender equality policies.
The Aftermath: What Was Gained and What Was Lost?
After the public sector wage settlement, the export sector made its CAs in
line with the higher pay increase level, significantly raising salaries. The origi-
nal idea of the CA, in which the pay increases were to be targeted to qualified
female-dominated jobs (including nurses) in the public sector, was to lift
them from the black hole of low wages and narrow the gender pay gap. This
ideal was lost along the road to implementation in the union rounds. The
nurses’ wages rose, but so did everyone else’s, thus the gender pay gap was un-
touched by the policy measure. We argue that in terms of outcomes of gender
policy, the case represents a combination of gender-neutral policy, failed pol-
icy, and gender accommodation, where traditional gender roles remained
entrenched in the gender pay gap.
This is further illustrated by our question of whether the equal pay initia-
tive resulted in increases in the nurses’ pay and a reduction in the gender pay
gap. The effects of this historically significant industrial action of female-dom-
inated trade unions were volatile and dependent upon the position taken with
regard to the bargaining process. First, there was the nurses’ unions aim to
gain a significant increase in pay; a success and a failure as some nurses did
get a significant increase in pay whilst others did not.
The pay differences between nurses grew (table 2). Since wage increases
were in percentage terms, the ones to gain the most were the nurses higher up
in the professional hierarchy who already had a better standard of pay. When
compared to the index 100 of all wage earners’ salaries in 2006, the index was
124.8 in all wage earners’ salaries in 2013. Registered nurses’ salaries were 27.2
percent higher in 2013 than in 2006, practical nurses’ salaries 24.4 percent,
and senior nursing officers’ salaries 33.7 percent higher (TEHY 2013; see ta-
ble 2). Practical nurses received almost the same level of pay rise as all other
wage earners. Registered nurses got a little bit more than other wage earners,
and the highest-ranking nurses received almost 10 percent more than the av-
erage wage earner during the period of 2006–2013. Our findings are that the
equal pay initiative did not narrow the gender pay gap but, since nursing is a
highly feminized occupation, it did result in the magnification of class-based
wage differences between women.
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In addition to seeking a considerable rise in nurses’ salaries, TEHY had
been pursuing a separate CA with KT for a long time. Both key trade union
actors we interviewed said that having their own CA would be the only long-
term solution to getting the necessary increases in nurses’ pay. Despite the fact
that the TEHY agreement was only an appendix to the General CA, with small
pay increases, and an implementation that proved difficult, it could have been
the beginning of a future separate CA for nurses. Soon after the resignation in
2013 of TEHY’s chairperson, who had been the leader of the 2007 industrial
action, TEHY renounced the TEHY agreement in favor of the general CA and
rejoined the joint bargaining organization TNJ in the municipal sector. For
Key trade union actor B, this represented the ultimate failure of the long
struggle to get increases in nurses’ pay. In the interview, she was tearful as she
described her thoughts:
Everything we had gained was lost. It would have not demanded any-
thing more than just persistence to stay separate. I understand that be-
cause of our own agreement we were not able to join in all the
negotiation tables but still we were able to have a large influence both
at the local level and the national level. We were such a big organiza-
tion. They could have not kicked us out [because us sticking with the
TEHY-agreement] even if they had wanted to. Well . . . But this hap-
pened. The path on which we had already moved forward – that does
not exist anymore.
Third, and not to be underestimated, was the political will in the conservative
right-wing government to narrow the pay gap between qualified and educated
women in the public sector and their male counterparts in the export sector.
However, the attempt to narrow the gap between the public and private sec-
tor, and increase especially nurses’ salaries, failed because its effects were mi-
nor with little longevity. Put simply, there was no gender transformation
outcome of the policy initiative.
The figure of “Nancy the Nurse” has made a lasting impact on the public
debate. In 2015, Nancy reemerged but in a totally different form. In the cur-
rent political and economic climate, “Nancy the Nurse” has become a conve-
nient scapegoat for Finland’s severe economic recession. This interpretation
of Nancy was actively brought up in the media and by right-wing politicians
to describe the “unreasonably” high pay increases since the union rounds in
2007. For example, the television channel MTV (2015) asked: “Is it the fault
of Nancy the Nurse that the [prime minister] Sipila¨’s government is sweating
painfully?” and Turun Sanomat wrote about “The long shadow of Nancy the
Nurse” (Turun Sanomat 2015). Nancy, who began life as the representative of
the movement for fair and equal pay, was now being constructed as the root
cause of Finland’s disappearing competitive edge—the demonized figure of
the woman who asked for too much and led the country into peril.
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Conclusion
Analyzing this case and trying to find out what kinds of effects the 2007
equal pay mobilization had engendered were made difficult because of the
highly charged responses the case elicited. Ten years on, and “Nancy the
Nurse” case is arguably an even more multilayered case to study, the complex-
ity of which both surprised and overwhelmed us. Studying the intersection be-
tween gender and the corporatist system in Finland has proven to be even
more conflict-ridden, power-laden, and prone to contradictory interpreta-
tions by different actors than we anticipated.
The case reveals how women in the public sector had a deep feeling of
wage injustice and that the Finnish corporatist labor market system offered lit-
tle hope for effective equal pay measures in female-dominated sectors. It also
showed that there was not enough political will among political leadership(s)
to crack open the frozen gender-segregated wage structures and raise salaries
in feminized occupations of the public sector.
The case of “Nancy the Nurse” has been described as an exceptional situa-
tion where the state interfered with wage determination. However, its excep-
tionality is less than clear cut, and there have been other cases of state
intervention. The right-wing conservative government meddled with wages
again in 2015 when it facilitated the negotiations of the so-called
Competitiveness Pact, which aimed to increase the competitiveness of Finnish
economy by lowering labor costs. The Pact hit the public sector especially
hard. In addition, the state has for decades given power to both social partners
to take part in political decision-making—especially in social politics—and
taken power away in wage determination. Therefore, the case of Nancy was
not as exceptional as it may seem in the context of the state taking an active
role in wage determination processes. What was exceptional was the direct na-
ture of the initiative, and that the party actors, and the government, sought to
influence the cemented wage differences between female- and male-domi-
nated professions. The equal pay measure itself was exceptional: the provision
of an extra e150 million subsidy.
In 2007, a window of opportunity for an initiative to promote equal pay
opened, and nurses’ low wages were brought into the focus of both parliamen-
tary elections and CA settlements. In addition, the financial situation was
good, markets were blooming, and the possibilities for a policy success seemed
abundant with optimism. However, what was not expected was the lack of po-
litical courage to target nurses directly with extra pay rises despite the exis-
tence of the additional budgetary flexibility to do so, and the way in which
corporatist institutions were able to resist the government’s equal pay initia-
tive. The policy initiative eventually stumbled in the negotiation stage in
which tactics of non–decision-making were employed to delegitimize nurses’
wage increases and change the direction of the negotiations.
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Above all, the case of “Nancy the Nurse” illustrates the very real difficulties
in changing gendered power structures, in this case gendered pay structures
under the conditions of Finnish corporatism. The metaphor of a “rubber
band” describes this process well, in signifying the elasticity of gendered insti-
tutions and how this helps them to resist and manage change. The analysis
shows how institutions can be stretched just far enough to aim at reaching
better, fairer, more gender equal outcomes, yet still resist until the rubber
band returns to its original equilibria, one that serves to illustrate the stability
of inequality.
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